教育: BA, 加州大学, 圣芭芭拉分校, 1999; MA, 富勒神学院, 2002; MA, 耶鲁大学, 2005; PhD, 罗格斯大学, 2012. 自2016年起在SPU工作.
Dr. 马修·本顿’s areas of expertise include Epistemology, 语言哲学, 宗教哲学, and Logic; his teaching is focused on each of these areas.
在来SPU之前, he was a postdoctoral research fellow in philosophy at the University of Oxford from 2012-2015 (as part of the New Insights and 方向 in Religious Epistemology 项目), and from 2015-2016 at the University of Notre Dame (as part of the Hope and Optimism: Conceptual and Empirical Investigations 项目).
His main research interests are in Epistemology (recently, 知识, 知道的人, 认识失败, 和fallibilism), as well as some allied areas in 语言哲学 (on assertion and related speech acts, 说谎, 假想的谓词, and testimony) and in 宗教哲学 (the epistemology of religion broadly construed, 以及邪恶的问题). He was recently awarded research grants from the John Templeton Foundation on 知识与上帝，并在 诚信哲学. In 2020, he was given SPU’s Scholar of the Year Award.
书
知识与上帝
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024
A main theme in religious epistemology is the possibility of knowledge of God. Philosophers often consider the rationality or justification of propositional belief about God. And they will assess the conditions under which such beliefs would be knowledge, particularly in light of counterevidence or religious disagreement. This book surveys such familiar areas, and then turns toward newer and less-developed terrain: interpersonal epistemology, namely what it is to know another person. It then explores the prospects for understanding what it might take to know God relationally, the contours of which are significant for many theistic traditions.
Religious Disagreement and Pluralism
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021
编辑:Jonathan L. Kvanvig. Epistemological questions about the significance of disagreement have advanced in concert with broader developments in social epistemology concerning testimony, the nature of expertise and epistemic authority, 机构的作用, 集团的信念, and epistemic injustice (among others). 在此期间, related issues in the epistemology of religion have reemerged as worthy of new consideration, and available to be situated with new conceptual tools. This volume explores many of the issues at the intersection of the epistemology of disagreement and religious epistemology: in particular, how to think carefully about religious diversity and disagreement, balancing epistemic humility with personal conviction, the place of religious belief in our social lives, and how best to think about truths concerning religion.
知识、信仰和上帝: New Insights in Religious Epistemology
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018
Edited with John Hawthorne and Dani Rabinowitz. Recent decades have seen fertile theorizing within mainstream epistemology which has had a dramatic impact on how epistemology is done. Religion is the place where such rethinking can potentially have its deepest impact and importance. Yet there has been surprisingly little infiltration of these new ideas into philosophy of religion and the epistemology of religious belief. 知识、信仰和上帝 incorporates these new developments in mainstream epistemology, and extends these developments to questions and arguments in religious epistemology. The investigations proposed in this volume offer substantial new life, 宽度, and sophistication to issues in the philosophy of religion and analytic theology. (更多信息，请参见: Revitalizing the Epistemology of Religion 来自OUP博客.)
选定的出版物
“The Epistemology of Interpersonal Relations,” 常识 (早期视图):1-20.
“断言依然有力(彼得·范·埃尔斯维克) 哲学研究 180 (2023): 27-50.
“分歧与宗教,” in Religious Disagreement and Pluralism——马修·A. 本顿和乔纳森·L. Kvanvig, eds. Oxford University Press, 2021, 1-40.
“Epistemological Aspects of Hope,” in 希望的道德心理学, Claudia Blöser and Titus Stahl, eds. 罗曼 & 中国农业科学，2019,35- 41.
“谎言、信仰和知识,” in 《赌博十大靠谱软件》， Jörg Meibauer主编. Oxford University Press, 2019, 120-133.
“God and Interpersonal Knowledge,” Res Philosophica 95 (2018): 421-447.
“Lying, Accuracy, and Credence,” 分析 78 (2018): 195-198.
“认识论个性化,” 哲学季刊 67 (2017): 813-834.
“Gricean质量,” 常识 50 (2016): 689-703.
“Expert Opinion and Second-Hand Knowledge,” 哲学 and Phenomenological Research 92 (2016): 492-508.
“邪恶与证据” (with John Hawthorne and Yoaav Isaacs), Oxford Studies in 宗教哲学 7 (2016): 1-31.
“知识规范,”Internet Encyclopedia of 哲学 (2014).
“Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion,” 分析 71 (2011): 684-687.
额外的资源
Dr. 本顿的网站
请参阅 Dr. 本顿的简历 (PDF) for a full list of his publications.